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POINT OF VIEW
BY JAMES A. GARDNER
After a long period of mount-ing public dissatisfaction with New York’s distinctively 
undemocratic system of judicial elec-
tions, the federal courts have finally 
forced the issue onto the state legis-
lative agenda by striking down the 
current system on federal constitu-
tional grounds. Reform proposals 
abound, most of which would make 
the system either more democratic, 
by opening up candidate access to 
the primary ballot, or less democratic, 
by substituting a system of executive 
appointment. None of these proposals, 
however, is likely to produce much 
of an improvement because none of 
them addresses the real problem. New 
York’s method for choosing judges 
is basically sensible and structurally 
sound. The dysfunction lies, rather, 
in New York’s party system, which 
is utterly moribund. Until the state 
develops a well-functioning system of 
competitive and publicly accountable 
political parties, no reform to the judi-
cial selection process can be expected 
to produce meaningful change.
The Real Problem
New Yorkers have long been dissatisfied 
with their system for electing judges, 
which has existed in its current form 
since 1921. In 1977, this dissatisfaction 
resulted in a constitutional amendment 
that removed the Court of Appeals from 
the electoral system and substituted a 
system of gubernatorial appointment.1 
Lower court judgeships, however, 
remain elective offices. Although pub-
lic dissatisfaction with judicial elections 
has not routinely prompted widespread 
movements for reform, it has manifested 
itself in more subtle ways, such as ballot 
rolloff and a general loss of confidence 
in the quality of state trial judges and the 
quality of justice. By 2003, Chief Judge 
Judith Kaye thought the problem seri-
ous enough to appoint a Commission to 
Promote Public Confidence in Judicial 
Elections (the “Feerick Commission”), 
which studied the problem and pro-
duced a set of recommendations for 
reform.2
While the Feerick Commission’s 
proposals were circulating, the federal 
District Court in Brooklyn dramatically 
altered the landscape with its deci-
sion in López Torres v. New York State 
Board of Elections,3 which invalidated 
on federal constitutional grounds New 
York’s method of electing trial judges. 
In affirming the District Court’s deci-
sion, the Second Circuit ruled that the 
structure of the state’s system of judicial 
nominating conventions violates asso-
ciational rights of party members that 
are protected by the First Amendment.4 
Specifically, the court held that “the 
First Amendment affords candidates 
and voters a realistic opportunity to 
participate in the nominating process,”5 
an opportunity that the current system 
of judicial selection unconstitutionally 
fails to provide. In view of these rul-
ings, the state now faces an urgent 
need to replace the invalidated system. 
If it does not, the District Court has said 
that it will impose a system of open pri-
maries for elective judicial offices.
While this outpouring of concern 
over New York’s dysfunctional judicial 
selection process is understandable, I 
shall argue here that it is misplaced. 
Although the judicial selection system 
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is broken, to be sure, its malfunction 
is only a symptom of a much more 
deeply rooted problem: the dysfunc-
tion of New York’s political parties 
and, in consequence, the state’s system 
of party democracy itself. Until these 
problems are addressed, no reform to 
the judicial selection process is likely 
to produce a significant improvement. 
In fact, there is nothing wrong with 
the structure of New York’s judicial 
selection institutions, which, at least on 
paper, are capable of working perfectly 
well; indeed, the underlying design 
premises of the present system are 
sound and sensible. 
The problem, rather, is with the 
behavior of actors within the institu-
tion. Evidently the party officials who 
in practice run the judicial selection 
process have entirely the wrong incen-
tives; they, and the parties for whom 
they act, lack the slightest degree of 
accountability for undesirable behav-
ior. A well-functioning party system 
can serve as a powerful tool of demo-
cratic accountability. In New York, this 
system has failed miserably. What we 
ought to have is a system in which 
parties compete to satisfy an obvious 
public demand for meaningful choice 
among the best possible candidates for 
judicial office. What we have instead is 
a system in which the parties collude 
for their private advantage, and in 
which they treat judgeships as a species 
of patronage that is theirs to dispense, 
on terms satisfactory to them alone. 
Instead of being the beneficiary of 
party competition, the people of New 
York have been shut out of the deal.
A Fair System, at Least on Paper
In its fundamental structure, New 
York’s system for electing supreme 
court justices can be best understood 
as an entirely reasonable response to 
the very real difficulties that inhere 
in any attempt to design a method 
for selecting judges in a democracy. 
Because of the peculiar combination of 
independence and accountability that 
judges in a democracy must possess, 
there is no way to select judges that 
does not face potentially serious flaws. 
The two principal methods for select-
ing judges – appointment and election 
– sit at opposite ends of a spectrum 
ranging from the least to the most 
democratic. Yet too much democracy 
can be as disruptive to the success of a 
judicial selection system as too little.
When approached in the right spir-
it, a system of judicial appointment, 
in which the governor or other chief 
executive does the appointing, can 
without a doubt produce outstanding 
judges. The main potential problem 
with appointment, however, is its sus-
ceptibility to abuse by the appoint-
ing official. Abuse of the appointing 
power most commonly takes the form 
of patronage appointments, in which 
judges are elevated to office on the 
basis of their personal loyalty to the 
governor, or as a reward for having 
performed some kind of service to the 
governor or the governor’s party – a 
condition of appointment. 
Until 1845, New York, like all 
states admitted in the nation’s first 40 
years, utilized a system of gubernato-
rial appointment of judges. In 1846, 
however, the state switched to elect-
ing its judges, for two reasons. First, 
a Jacksonian impulse toward greater 
democracy swept the nation during 
this period, a trend from which New 
York was not immune. This impulse 
was driven by an assumption – not 
always well explored – that all or near-
ly all public officials, including judges, 
should be popularly elected. In New 
York, however, the switch to an elec-
tive judiciary also responded to a wide-
spread belief that the state’s governors 
had been distributing judgeships as a 
kind of patronage.6 In New York, then, 
the election of judges rests historically 
on the belief that elected judges will 
be more independent, fairer, and more 
impartial than appointed judges.
The election of judges is by no 
means, however, a panacea. Electing 
judges, to be sure, addresses the prob-
lem of gubernatorial patronage to 
some degree, but does so by switch-
ing the object of judges’ dependence 
from the governor to the public. In 
a democracy, of course, the depen-
dence of officials on public approval 
is normally thought to be desirable, 
but when the officials in question are 
judges, the practice raises at least three 
well-known potential problems. First, 
it is possible, and perhaps likely, that 
the public will be unable meaningfully 
to evaluate the qualifications of judi-
cial candidates and the performance 
of sitting incumbents. Second, an elec-
tive judiciary raises the possibility that 
judges will pander to public opinion 
in their decisions rather than impar-
tially applying the law. This is espe-
cially a concern after the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s highly unfortunate decision in 
Republican Party of Minnesota v. White,7 
which held that many commonplace 
state ethics rules restricting the scope 
of judicial campaigning violate the 
First Amendment. Third, requiring 
judges to run for election requires 
them to raise the necessary funds, and 
the need to raise money opens judi-
cial candidates to a different kind of 
corruption: the excessive influence of 
monied special interests.
Because both appointment and 
election raise such potentially serious 
problems, most states select their judg-
es using some kind of hybrid system 
that is deliberately structured to avoid 
each of the extremes. The most com-
mon method by far is the so-called 
“Missouri Plan,” in which judges are 
appointed initially by the governor, 
often from a list of candidates recom-
mended by a bipartisan or nonpartisan 
screening commission, and then stand 
periodically for democratic review in 
uncontested, nonpartisan retention 
elections.8 New York’s present sys-
tem, adopted in 1921, was designed 
Most states
select their judges 
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in the same spirit. It offers, on paper, 
a perfectly sensible and plausible way 
to combine the advantages of appoint-
ment and election, while avoiding the 
worst of their respective risks. 
New York’s system of electing 
supreme court judges proceeds in 
three stages. The first consists of a 
primary election, not of judicial can-
didates, but of delegates.9 These del-
egates are selected by each party’s 
rank-and-file membership for the sole 
purpose of attending a judicial nomi-
nating convention. Because delegates 
exercise no function other than the 
selection of the party’s judicial candi-
dates, the system clearly contemplates 
that delegates will be elected by party 
members on the basis of their ability 
to evaluate the qualifications of poten-
tial judicial candidates. In the second 
stage, the elected delegates convene 
at their respective judicial nomina-
tion conventions to select their party’s 
judicial candidates.10 Under the cir-
cumstances, it seems clear that the sys-
tem contemplates that the delegates, 
selected for their expertise in things 
judicial, will nominate only the very 
best candidates that their parties are 
capable of inducing to run. Up to this 
point, incidentally, the system bears 
a distinct resemblance to the federal 
Electoral College, which was designed 
to deal with what was thought at the 
time to be an analogous problem: the 
incompetence of the people to select 
a president. The Framers’ solution, 
echoed in the 1921 New York judi-
cial convention plan, was that where 
the people are deemed incompetent 
to perform some necessary function of 
democratic oversight, their role should 
be limited to the election of compe-
tent intermediaries who will make the 
actual decisions.
The New York system, however, 
is more democratic than the Electoral 
College in that it provides for a third 
and final stage in which the selec-
tion of judges is referred back to the 
people for a final decision. Delegates 
to the judicial nominating conven-
tions do not select judges, but instead 
merely designate nominees to run as 
candidates of their respective parties. 
The ultimate choice among what the 
system contemplates will be highly 
qualified, competing candidates for 
judicial office is reserved for the people 
through direct popular election.11
As a matter of design, this system 
provides an admirably balanced mix of 
popular participation and professional 
expertise. By including the people at 
both the beginning and the end of 
the process, it seems well calculated to 
secure all the benefits of popular par-
ticipation in judicial elections as a guard 
against official patronage. At the same 
time, by leaving the actual identifica-
tion of judicial candidates to individu-
als who are selected precisely for that 
purpose, the system secures the benefits 
of quality and competence associated 
with appointment by informed and 
well-qualified experts, while avoiding 
the pitfalls of public incompetence in 
the identification and evaluation of the 
qualifications of good potential judges. 
On paper, then, New York’s method for 
selecting supreme court judges ought to 
work as well as any other.
A Failed Party System
The problem today, of course, is that the 
state’s judicial selection system simply 
isn’t working as intended. The public 
continues to do what is asked of it. The 
parties, however, are not by any means 
performing the role assigned to them 
under the law. Indeed, the parties have 
perverted the operation of the system 
to the extent that it is barely recogniz-
able as democratic. Although official 
patronage has successfully been mar-
ginalized, the public in fact plays no 
meaningful role. Contrary to its design 
assumptions, New York’s system has 
been deformed into one that dispenses 
patronage, but the patronage is hand-
ed out by the political parties rather 
than by the governor. The result is a 
judicial selection process dominated 
by party officials that is every bit as 
corrupt as the pathologies of appoint-
ment and election that it was so care-
fully designed to avoid. 
How exactly is this happening? 
What are the parties doing to thwart 
the proper operation of the system? 
Here are just four of the most egre-
gious offenses:12
1. The parties are extorting benefits, 
such as donations of money and 
services, from judicial candidates, 
including from sitting judges who 
seek reelection or election to a 
higher court.
2. The parties are attempting to 
influence the behavior of sitting 
judges by creating an informal, 
and extralegal, form of judicial 
promotion in which candidates 
must pay their dues in lower 
or specialized courts before the 
party will consider nominating 
them for supreme court.
3. The parties are not seeking out, 
and indeed are driving away, 
many highly qualified candidates, 
who are unwilling either to be 
extorted or to put in long service 
in a specialized lower court in 
which they have no interest, and 
then to have that service subject-
ed to review not by voters, but by 
party officials.
4. Worst of all, the parties are col-
luding to thwart the possibility of 
meaningful popular choice, and 
to maintain their own power over 
judicial selection, by cutting deals 
about whom to run, when, and 
where, including cross-endorse-
ment deals within judicial dis-
tricts and even non-opposition 
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and cross-endorsement deals that 
cross district boundaries.
In short, the parties are not compet-
ing, as they should, for the approval 
and votes of the electorate. Given the 
crucial role assigned to the parties 
by the state judicial selection system, 
the system cannot possibly function 
properly if the parties fail to play 
their assigned role. Why don’t they 
do so? The short answer is that New 
York’s party system has become so 
completely dysfunctional that it no 
longer serves any positive role in the 
democratic process.13
No Meaningful Party Democracy
Although the reasons behind the col-
lapse of New York’s system of politi-
cal parties are complex, I believe it is 
possible nonetheless to trace much 
of the present dysfunction to one, 
and possibly two, underlying issues: 
(1) the bipartisan gerrymander of the 
state Legislature, and (2) the three-
men-in-a-room problem.
Political scientists have long argued 
that political parties are essential to any 
kind of meaningful popular control 
over government. The theory of party 
democracy, often called the respon-
sible party model, goes something like 
this:14 In a mass democracy, the people 
cannot and do not participate actively 
in the formulation of policy, and thus 
do not exercise any form of direct con-
trol over government policy. Instead, 
the people exercise a form of indirect 
control in that, if a majority of the pop-
ulace feels that its wants are not being 
satisfied, it can replace the set of rulers 
in power with an alternate set; it can, 
that is, “vote the bums out.” According 
to political scientists, this form of indi-
rect popular control requires political 
parties because only parties can pro-
vide the coherent, unified sets of rulers 
who will assume collective responsi-
bility to the people for the manner in 
which government power is used. For 
this system to work, each party must 
promote a coherent program of poli-
cies designed to satisfy the people’s 
wishes. The party that wins a majority 
of the offices of government in the elec-
tion then takes over the entire power of 
the government and the entire respon-
sibility for what the government does, 
and uses its power to put its program 
into effect. If it does a good job, the 
voters will keep it in power. If it does 
not, the voters will turn it out and des-
ignate a competing party to run things 
more to their liking.
In New York, any possibility of 
meaningful party democracy has been 
utterly thwarted by the parties’ col-
lusive legislative gerrymander, an 
arrangement that has for 30 years allo-
cated firm control of the state Assembly 
to Democrats and of the state Senate to 
Republicans15 – an impressive achieve-
ment in a state in which registered 
Democrats outnumber registered 
Republicans by approximately five 
to three.16 This gerrymander fatally 
undermines the operation of the state’s 
system of party democracy because it 
thoroughly thwarts the ability of the 
electorate to hold any party account-
able for the actions of the government. 
Because of the gerrymander, not only 
can neither party be voted out of the 
chamber it controls, but no single party 
can ever control the entire government. 
Since neither party can be disciplined 
by the voters, neither party has any 
incentive to be responsive to the voters’ 
wishes – exactly the kind of incentive 
that a well-functioning party system is 
supposed to provide. Under these cir-
cumstances, the parties are entirely free 
to run the judicial selection process (as 
well as any other aspect of state gover-
nance) however they want without fear 
of retribution from the voters. If they 
choose to run the system collusively 
rather than competitively, the voters 
are virtually powerless to stop them.
In New York, the problems flowing 
from the collusive gerrymander of the 
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state Legislature are compounded by 
another charming local custom: gov-
ernment by three men in a room. In 
this system, the messy complexity of 
an actual representative legislature is 
stripped down to a simple system in 
which essentially all significant legisla-
tive power is delegated by the Assembly 
to the speaker and by the Senate to the 
majority leader. These two legislators 
then negotiate the legislative agenda of 
the state directly and personally with 
the governor, behind closed doors. This 
practice further destroys the account-
ability of the political parties not only 
because of its opacity, but because it 
delegates and concentrates legislative 
power in the hands of individuals who 
are beyond the reach of public retribu-
tion. In this system, all significant legis-
lative policy decisions are made by the 
two legislative leaders, yet only a tiny 
fraction of the electorate has any power 
to hold the leaders electorally account-
able. The leaders consequently lack 
any incentive at all to be responsive to 
the wishes of the vast majority of New 
York voters, and the only voters they 
need to worry about are voters in their 
own safely gerrymandered districts, so 
they need not really worry about their 
own constituents either. Such a system 
has more in common with a hereditary 
aristocracy than a democracy.
Break Up the Bipartisan 
Gerrymander
Proposals for reforming New York’s 
judicial selection process fall gener-
ally into one of two opposing camps: 
those that would make the process 
less democratic by creating a system 
of gubernatorial and mayoral appoint-
ment; and those that would make the 
process more democratic by instituting 
a more open form of primary elec-
tions. Neither type of proposal is likely 
to make much of a difference in the 
operation of the selection process, or in 
the ability of the parties to subvert that 
process for their own benefit, until the 
defects in the party system outlined 
above have been addressed.
Let’s start with appointment. 
Virtually all proposals to replace the 
current elective system with an appoint-
ive one attempt to avoid the problem of 
gubernatorial patronage by making use 
of a bipartisan screening commission.17 
Under such proposals, the governor 
may appoint only candidates who have 
been cleared by the commission, which 
will in theory forward to the governor 
the names only of the most qualified 
candidates to be found in the state. 
Until the party system is fixed, how-
ever, this is a false hope.
The theory of bipartisan candidate 
screening proceeds on the premise 
that political parties with opposing 
interests will be able to find common 
ground only by settling on candidates 
who are uncontroversially of the high-
est quality. However, as their current 
behavior indicates, if the parties are 
not publicly accountable, they are both 
willing and able to reach agreement on 
other grounds besides candidate qual-
ity, and one such ground has been, and 
is likely to continue to be, the parties’ 
mutual, private advantage. 
In assessing the likelihood that an 
independent judicial screening com-
mission will produce better-quality 
judges than the highly politicized sys-
tem now in place, it is also instructive 
to look at a similar area, facing similar 
problems: redistricting. Numerous of 
the reform proposals are based on 
the proposition that gerrymandering 
will stop, and genuinely competitive 
elections will be possible, only if the 
redistricting function is taken from the 
Legislature and given to an indepen-
dent redistricting commission, usually 
of bipartisan composition.18 Yet recent 
studies of the work of independent 
redistricting commissions already in 
operation have consistently found no 
good evidence that these commissions 
produce districting plans that are more 
competitive, or state legislatures that 
are more responsive, than when redis-
tricting is performed by the legislature 
itself.19 There is no reason to suppose a 
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different result for independent, bipar-
tisan judicial screening commissions. 
Then there is the elephant in the 
room that nobody really wants to 
acknowledge: For 30 years New York 
has used just such a judicial nominat-
ing commission to screen candidates 
for gubernatorial appointment to the 
Court of Appeals. Has this system pro-
duced the best possible high court? Has 
the commission successfully purged 
partisanship and patronage entire-
ly from the appointment equation? 
Seemingly not. Although the nominat-
ing commission method seemed to 
work relatively well for a while, it 
has not lived up to its potential in 
some time. I don’t mean to suggest by 
any means that recent appointments 
to the Court of Appeals have been of 
poor quality, but in a state with what 
is surely the greatest accumulation of 
legal talent in the nation, perhaps in 
the world, the appointment process 
cannot honestly be said to have ele-
vated, or even to have considered, the 
very best of the best. There is no reason 
to suppose a screening commission 
would produce any better results if its 
charge were extended to lower court 
judges; indeed, the federal experience 
suggests that considerations other than 
quality tend to become much more 
important as one descends the judicial 
hierarchy, and that is true even in the 
presence of a reasonably well-function-
ing and accountable party system on 
the national level.
The other family of reform proposals 
making the rounds – and the one that 
will be imposed by the U.S. District 
Court should the Legislature fail to act 
– would move in the opposite direction 
by further democratizing the judicial 
selection process through a system of 
open primaries. Such primaries would 
create alternative routes to nomination 
for elective judgeships by permitting 
voters to consider not only the “offi-
cial” candidates backed by state and 
local party leaders, but also “unof-
ficial” candidates who, though not 
supported by party leaders, command 
significant support among the party 
rank and file. The motivation behind 
such a reform seems to be to break the 
leadership’s stranglehold over nomina-
tions and allow independent, insurgent 
candidates to crack open the system.
Until New York acquires a meaning-
ful system of party competition, how-
ever, this too is unlikely to produce any 
great improvement. As an initial mat-
ter, the open primary proposals have 
all the flaws associated with excessive 
popular involvement in judicial selec-
tion. First, the public has little basis 
on which to evaluate the candidates. 
Second, judicial campaigns tend to be 
of low salience for the majority of vot-
ers and turnout is far lower in judicial 
races than in races further up the bal-
lot.20 Low turnout is even more of a 
problem in primaries, the only phase 
of the process that these reforms would 
affect, and those who do turn out tend 
disproportionately to be party activists 
and loyalists,21 who would likely sup-
port the inside party candidate in any 
case. As a result, the parties are likely 
to be just as dominant under an open 
primary system as under the current 
system.
Furthermore, even in a more open 
system of primary selection, candidates 
supported by the formal party organi-
zation will still have a huge advantage 
over independent party candidates 
because they and only they will have 
access to party campaign resources 
and expertise. At most, all an open 
primary is likely to do is to allow party 
outsiders who are rich enough to self-
finance their own campaigns to bring 
themselves to the attention of the party 
leadership. Interparty cross-nomina-
tion and noncompete deals will still 
POINT OF VIEW
NYSBA on Selecting Judges 
The New York State Bar Association has supported a merit system 
of judicial selection since 1973. In 1993 the Association’s House of 
Delegates approved “A Model Plan for Implementing the New York 
State Bar Association’s Principles for Selecting Judges” (the “Model 
Plan”) that would amend the New York State Constitution to replace 
the current selection process with a merit selection system. Key compo-
nents of the Model Plan include the following:
• The proposal would cover the Supreme Court, including the 
Appellate Division; County, Family and Surrogate’s Courts; the Court of 
Claims; the Civil and Criminal Court of the City of New York; full-time 
city courts outside New York City; and the District Courts.
• Nonpartisan nominating commissions would propose three “high-
ly qualified” candidates for each judicial vacancy.
• A statewide nominating commission would propose candidates 
for appointment by the Governor to the Court of Claims.
• Four department-wide nominating commissions would pro-
pose candidates for appointment by the Governor to the Appellate 
Division. 
• A New York City nominating commission would propose candi-
dates for appointment by the Mayor to trial courts in New York City.
• Judicial district nominating commissions would propose candi-
dates for appointment to Supreme, County, Surrogate’s, Family and 
District Courts outside New York City, with appointment being made 
by the Governor in the case of Supreme Court and the chief elected 
official of the county in the case of the other courts.
The Model Plan has served as a key resource in the development of 
current legislation to implement a merit-selection system and efforts 
by the Association to reform the current process for selection of New 
York’s judges.
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allow parties to marshal the resources 
to crush outsider campaigns, and as a 
result the parties will still have ample 
means to co-opt serious independents. 
What is needed is a system that gives 
parties an incentive to choose the very 
best candidates, and to offer them com-
petitively to the public. An open pri-
mary system does not do that, and the 
parties will lack such an incentive until 
the public is able to hold them account-
able for their behavior.
Such accountability will not be 
possible until, at a minimum, the 
bipartisan gerrymander of the state 
Legislature is broken up. Only when 
political parties are forced actually to 
compete with one another for control 
of the Legislature can voters influence 
the content of governmental policy. 
Only when the voters have the ability 
to dislodge one party from legislative 
power and install its competitor will 
they have the ability to hold par-
ties accountable for their behavior, 
thereby providing the parties with 
meaningful incentives to alter their 
behavior to conform to public wish-
es. Obviously, the Legislature will 
not undertake this task by itself. The 
electorate could do it, of course, but 
the parties seem to have a knack 
for mutual self-preservation that 
leads them to mollify the public – or 
enough of the public to avert a threat 
– just before the point that it gets 
angry enough to do something. That 
leaves the courts in the best position 
to address the problems posed by the 
offending gerrymander.
The Second Circuit’s decision in 
López Torres is troubling in many 
respects, but its most troubling feature 
by far is that the court simply misana-
lyzed the problem. The reason New 
York’s system of judicial selection is 
dysfunctional has little to do with 
its underlying legal structure, which 
the court precipitously invalidated. 
It has instead everything to do with 
the dysfunction of New York’s party 
system. As a rule, I am disturbed when 
a federal court steps in to dictate to a 
state how it has to structure its internal 
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political system,22 and I would much 
rather see this matter handled by state 
courts as a matter of state constitution-
al law, which furnishes many poten-
tially promising grounds on which 
to restrain abuse of the redistricting 
process. If federal courts are going to 
intervene, however, I would rather see 
such intervention where it would do 
some good – to break up the state’s 
collusive, bipartisan legislative gerry-
mander – than to invalidate a specific 
and perfectly reasonable choice made 
by New Yorkers about how to set up 
a particular aspect of their democratic 
self-governance.  ■
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